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1. Introduction 
    The objective of this paper is to analyze a major question of bank 
regulatory policy, which has renewed its urgency in view of the re-
cent Basel II Accord on capital ratios: that is, should regulatory 
agencies close (reorganize) a near insolvent but insured bank? If so, 
when? What are the effects of the new regulatory capital levels on 
bank's closure policies? 
    Although there has been a sizeable literature on deposit insurance 
pricing since the pioneering work by Merton (1977, 1978), who first 
suggested to model deposit insurance as a put option on bank assets 
that is written by the regulator/insurer and held by the bank equity 
holders with a strike price equal to the face value of the insured de-
posits - and since then there have been a few contributions on the 
impact of deposit insurance on risk-shifting and on bank equity capi-
tal (see Pennacchi 1987; Ronn and Verma 1986; Marcus and Shaked 
1984; Pyle 1984; Duan, Moreau and Sealy 1992) - little guidance 
has been offered about the timing of bank reorganizations and the 
impact of regulatory capital requirements. 
    Acharya and Dreyfus (1989) first derived an endogenous bank 
closure rule, while previous work assumed an exogenously specified 
minimum level of asset-to-deposits ratio below which to close a  
bank. In most literature there is no divergence between the bank's 
and the regulator's incentives to exercise their options and close the 
bank. A few exceptions are Acharya (1996), because a stochastic 
charter value is included, Bhattacharya, Plank, Strobl and Zechner 
(2002), where the regulatory authority chooses the closure rule such 
that equity holders become indifferent with respect to the risk the 
bank takes, and Allen and Saunders (1993), because regulators are 
allowed to exercise the deposit insurance put prematurely, which has 
the effect of lowering the value of the deposit insurance put, hence 
increasing the critical closure threshold. Other papers have examined 
forbearance, that is, the regulator's intentional delay in forcing a 
bank closure, following a policy that would grant the bank the time 
to return to solvency before the closure rule is enforced (see, f.e. 
Duan and Yu 1994). An argument against forbearance is that banks 
have a greater incentive to gamble the greater is the probability of 
forbearance if deposits are insured. In fact, banks seem to be willing 
to transfer wealth from the regulator either by decreasing bank capi-
tal (Calomiris and Kahn 1991) or by holding assets with high vari-
ability of returns (McCulloch 1986; Duan, Moreau and Sealey 
1992). As a consequence, policies are called for in order to mitigate 
risk-shifting and to induce banks to improve the quality of their as-
sets. 
    Such concern is fundamental in the Basel accords on capital stan-
dards. The 1988 Basel accord explicitly considered only credit risk 
and imposed an 8% capital requirement on assets belonging to the 
same asset category or asset risk bucket. For example, all commer-
cial loans belonged to the same 100% category, irrespective of the 
differences in credit quality, obligor or industry. The more recent 
Basel II Accord has been fine-tuned to accommodate some risks not 
initially considered and, in particular, to allow for different risk 
weights within the same asset category. 
    In this paper we examine the effects of capital adequacy rules on 
banks' behaviour using a dynamic framework. Most papers on capi-
tal requirements (Kahane 1977, Furlong and Keeley 1989, Rochet 
1992, Kim and Santomero 1988,  Kohen and Santomero 1980) de-
velop static models on the asset-substitution problem. Kahane 
(1977) and Koehn and Santomero (1980) use a mean-variance 
model, while Furlong and Keeley (1989) utilize both a state-
preference framework and an option pricing model. They show that 
a bank that is sufficiently risk-lover will choose a riskier mix of as-
sets in response to a higher capital requirement. Kim and Santomero 
(1988) extend the portfolio-selection approach to the case of an as-
set-risk weighted system. Basically, most results are explained by 
the different underlying assumptions about the curvature of bank 
managers risk-return preference, as Rochet (1992) and Gennotte and 
Pyle (1991) have stressed. In most circumstances, an increase in 
bank capital is unambiguously associated with a reduction in the 
bank investments in risky assets, so that capital requirements are 
seen as useful instruments for reducing the incentive to increase risk. 
Other papers (Gennotte and Pyle 1991, Blum 1999, Pelizzon and 
Schaefer 2003) show that capital requirements may sometimes have 
a perverse incentive, that is, banks take on more risk. In particular, 
when a dynamic model is taken into account (Blum 1999, Pelizzon 
and Schaefer 2003) a tighter capital requirement may lower the ex-
pected profits of the bank, hence the bank has less to lose in the 
event of bankruptcy, and, as a consequence, the risk-taking incentive 
may increase. Indeed, as Gennotte and Pyle (1991) have stressed, 
there are two effects of higher capital requirements on the probabil-
ity of bankruptcy: on one side, they reduce leverage, hence the prob-
ability of bankruptcy reduces; on the other hand, asset risk might in-
crease, which increases the probability of bankruptcy. Which effect 
prevails depends on a ratio of the elasticities to the net present value 
of investment with respect to the mean and variance of the present 
value. 
   Other papers have emphasized that capital requirements alone will 
not necessarily improve the overall safety and soundness of banks.  
Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) suggest that combining a de-
posit rate ceiling with capital regulation can unambiguously induce 
all banks to decrease riskiness in their portfolios. Morrison and 
White (2005) suggest a mixing of an audit policy and capital regula-
tion to improve efficiency and to limit the possibility of adverse se-
lection. Further recent studies of bank capital regulation are re-
viewed in VanHoose (2007). 
   Almost all the above-mentioned papers are mainly concerned with 
the impact of risk-based capital requirements on the bank portfolio 
strategies and asset risk, but do not address bank closure policies 
specifically. 
    The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we study the timing 
of bank reorganization, formulating a bank closure policy and the 
corresponding pricing of deposit insurance in a setting that is more 
complex than the one studied in the literature, because we introduce 
a more appropriate notion of capital adequacy. Our notion is in 
keeping with the basic standardized model of the Basel II Accord on 
capital ratios and allows us to make a comparison of the impact of 
the two Basel I and Basel II accords on banks' behaviour. 
    Second, we build on a model which extends Merton (1978) in two 
directions. We introduce two risky assets instead of one in order to 
have different risk weights and a more appropriate notion of capital 
requirements; moreover, we allow for dividends payouts and con-
sider the cost of reorganization when bank capital proves to be in-
adequate. We examine the effects of capital requirements on risk-
shifting, bank reorganization and bankruptcy. In common with much 
of the literature we study the present value of the deposit insurance 
liabilities as a metric for riskiness. 
    Our paper is more closely related with Bhattacharya, Plank, Strobl 
and Zechner (2002), Blum (1999), Pelizzon and Schaefer (2003). 
However, Blum (1999) does not deal with bank closure policies,  
considers a two-period model with a single risky asset and uses a 
very special definition of risk. Bhattacharya, Plank, Strobl and 
Zechner (2002) consider a model of optimal bank closure rules but 
have a single risky asset, do not take into account the possibility of 
bank reorganization and their measure of capital requirements does 
not conform to the definition stated in the capital adequacy direc-
tives. Pelizzon and Schaefer (2003) deal mainly with risk manage-
ment strategies and their main results are obtained with numerical 
simulations only. 
    The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Section 3 describes the regulator's problem, deriving the deposit in-
surance premium and the closure policy. Section 3 contains the 
evaluation of bank equity and discusses the main results about the 
effects of capital requirements on risk-shifting and bank reorganiza-
tion. Finally, Section 4 concludes and indicates further avenues of 
research. 
 
2.The Model                                                                                                 
We consider a bank which will remain in operation unless the regu-
lator/insurer intervenes to close (or reorganize) the bank. The bank 
holds some specialized assets, notably loans, and is financed by eq-
uity and a variety of other liabilities, collectively referred to as de-
posits, which are assumed to be all insured. The insurer charges a 
premium for the deposit insurance, which is paid by the bank's eq-
uity holders. Bank managers make decisions in the interest of the 
equity holders. Bank assets are classified into two categories, ac-
cording to their riskiness and the credit quality of the obligor. We 
denote by  iV , ,1=i  2,  the two categories of the same type of finan-
cial asset which enter the total asset value with weights iθ  and as-
sume that  iiiiii dZVdtVdV σµ +=  , where  iµ  and  iσ  are constant, 
idZ  denotes a Wiener process and  dtdZdZE ρ=)( 21 . Denote by  
D  the value of the bank's aggregate deposits. Let  g be the rate of 
growth in deposits,  Dr  the rate of interest paid by the bank on de-
posits and suppose that depositors withdraw a constant fraction γ  of 
interest, accrued over the preceding period, so that the remaining 
fraction  ( )γ−1  is added to the value of the bank deposits. The dy-
namics for aggregate deposits are non-stochastic and described by  
dD  g  rD1  Ddt  nDdt  with r  ≥  Dr  and δ = g - γDr   ≤ 0 
(in order to avoid that the bank may run a "Ponzi game"). Thus, the 
dynamics of the value of total bank assets follow: 
+++ )( 111111 dZVdVDdt σµθδ +dtV222 (µθ )222 dZVσ . 
The regulator charges the bank a premium to insure all the deposits 
of the bank  in perpetuity, provided that the bank is solvent, that is if  
1V1  2V2  D  . Following Merton (1978) we suppose that sol-
vency of the bank is ascertained by audit. The regulator may ap-
praise the economic value of the bank assets  and liabilities on an 
appointed date. The residual capital position is then compared to the 
capital adequacy standard, which is computed as follows, in keeping 
with the basic standardized model of the Basel II Accord on capital 
ratios. The book value of each asset category is multiplied by a risk 
weight  iy  according to the different risk bucket into which the loan 
is classified and then by 8% (which is the coefficient required by the 
Basel Accords on capital ratios to generate the minimum capital re-
quirement). Table 1 shows the different capital requirements under 
Basel I (third line from above) and Basel II (fifth line from above). 
 
Table 1 (Basel I vs Basel II) 
 
Rating AAA/AA- A+/A- BB+/BB- below BB- unrated 
 
Weights iy  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Capital  
Requirements 
8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
Weights iy  20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Capital  
Requirements 
1.6% 4% 8% 12% 8% 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001 
 
 Let:  
 
     )(08.0 2221112211 VyVyDVV θθθθ +≥−+                   (1) 
 
Suppose 2σ  > 1σ . Then  12 yy ≥ , in keeping with most standard de-
fault prediction models. If (1) is satisfied, then bank capital is judged 
to be adequate and there is no regulatory interference. Notice that if  
y1  y2  1,  then expression (1) states the notion of capital ade-
quacy for the same type of financial instrument as from the Basel I 
Accord on capital ratios. Under the foundation approach of the new 
Basel II Accord the same type of financial instrument is assigned 
different risk weights, that is  yi  20%,50%, 100%,150% , depend-
ing on the credit quality of the obligor. If (1) is not satisfied, then 
bank capital proves to be inadequate and its classification varies 
with the extent of the deficiency. As a condition for continued insur-
ance, we assume that bank managers are expected to make up some 
of the deficiency by restricting current and subsequent dividends. 
Denote by α the proportional dividend that is assumed to be distrib-
uted to equity holders in case of solvency. We suppose that if (1) is 
not satisfied, then  0=α  as a condition for continued deposit insur-
ance. Finally, when the book value of equity is assessed to zero, the 
regulator declares the bank "technically insolvent". We can consider 
also the case where it can force a bank to technical insolvency only 
when the market value of assets falls seriously below that of its de-
posit liabilities, so that forbearance is allowed. In this case, an insol-
vency resolution occurs if the asset value falls below  Dβ  where  
1≤β  (that is, if  1V1  2V2  D  0  ). If  1=β  the liabilities 
facing the insurer reduce to the familiar put option: then the regula-
tor liquidates the bank and exercises the put option to pay the de-
positors off. In any case there is a cost of audit, which is assumed to 
be  kDDc =)( , borne by the insurer and taken into account when the 
insurance premium is computed. 
 
3. The regulator’s policy 
The regulator chooses the insurance premium  P  and the closure 
policy. Given the audit report, it may either liquidate the bank or 
keep it in operation, deciding what  P  PV1 ,V2 ,D   to charge the 
bank. We suppose the event of audit to be Poisson distributed, with 
the probability of an audit over the next instant equal to  dtλ   the 
probability of no audit is equal to  dtλ−1  and the probability of 
more than one audit of order  Odt  . It is assumed that the Poisson 
process and  dZi    are independent. Following Merton (1978), we 
put  0=δ   for simplicity and indicate cash outflows as positive in-
flows, so that the derived values are positive instead of negative. In 
the absence of costs and if there are no dividends,  
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Adopting the standard Dixit-Pindyck framework, we get 
1Ψ+dP 1dV + 2Ψ 2dV = Pr( dtVV )2211 Ψ+Ψ+ , so that for i = 1,2, 
 i   i PVi  . 
Thus, we get the partial differential equation of the Black-Scholes 
type: 
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Suppose now there are dividends, so that  
dVi  i  Vidt  iii dZVσ .  Then:  
  
0))((
21
21
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2211
212121
2
2
2
2
2
22
12
1
2
1
2
12
1
=−+−+
+++
++
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
rPVVr
nDVV
VV
V
P
V
P
D
P
VV
P
V
P
V
P
θθα
θθσρσ
θσθσ
        (4) 
 
To simplify the notation let  G( DVV ,, 21 ) = 2
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if 1V1  2V2  D  0 . 
 
They have the following interpretation. If the bank is solvent and (1) 
is satisfied, then bank capital is judged to be adequate and there is no 
regulatory interference, as from (5); otherwise, as from (6), the bank 
cannot pay any dividends ( 0=α ) and reorganization is required. In 
any case, if an audit takes place there is a cash flow of  kDDc =)( . 
Finally, if the market value of assets falls seriously below that of its 
deposit liabilities, like in (7), there is a second cash flow of  D    
1V1  2V2   and  the liability of the insurer ceases. To simplify the 
notation let us define   11V1  22V2/V   where  
V  1V1  2V2 . Under a suitable change in variables and choice 
of parameters, with DVx /=  and DPp /= , the equation system 
(5)-(6)-(7) becomes: 
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)./())( 1212 σσσσ −−y  We will consider parameter values such that  
1<ξ  for any  1σ , 2σ ,σ   and  21, yy   as requested in the foundation 
approach of the Basel II Accord. Observe that if  121 == yy  then  
08.0=ξ ,  as from the Basel I Accord. By solving equation system 
(8)-(9)-(10) we get Proposition 1, where  q   are the solutions to the 
algebraic equation related to (8),  −a,1   the solutions to the algebraic 
equation related to (9) and  b   the solutions to the algebraic equa-
tion related to (10): 
 
Proposition 1. The present value of the deposit insurance liability 
(p) chosen by the regulator has the following expression: 
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with  
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Proof.  Expressions (11), (12), (13) can be obtained applying the 
smooth-pasting and high-order conditions on equations (8), (9), (10) 
that is, )~(xp = )~( xp , *)( xp = *)(0 xp , )~(' xp = )~(' xp , *)(' xp  
= *)('0 xp  and the no-bubble condition on p(x). 
 
Observe that if  1=β   and  0=α  then expressions (11)-(12)-(13) 
collapse into Merton's expressions for the regulator's liabilities (see 
Merton 1978). We obtain the following results from a comparative 
statics analysis. 
 
REMARK 1. p   is not a monotonically decreasing  function of  x. 
Such result follows from the property of the audit cost, that is, a 
monotonically increasing function of x  . For  x   sufficiently large, 
the expected number of audits prior to an audit where the bank is 
found to be insolvent increases: thus, the cost increases with x , 
which completely offset the "put option part" which is decreasing in  
x. 
 
REMARK 2. If capital forbearance is in place, cash payments re-
sulting from the deposit insurance guarantee are higher, other 
things being equal. 
Straightforward computation shows that for  x  x   , the derivative 
of p  with respect to  β  is negative, given the other parameter val-
ues. Therefore, the future liability increases as a result of continuing 
to provide insurance when the market value of assets falls seriously 
below that of its deposit liabilities and the regulator allows for for-
bearance. If  1=β  the liabilities facing the insurer reduce to the fa-
miliar put option. 
 
REMARK 3. The value of deposit insurance increases as capital 
requirements increase, other things being equal.  
For  x  x   , the derivative of p   with respect to ξ  is positive, 
given the other parameter values. Thus, increasing capital require-
ments may limit the bank's ability to exploit its rents in the future, so 
that it can lead to an increase in the value of deposit insurance liabil-
ity. Such result has to be compared with the usual asset-substitution 
effect which has been emphasized in the literature. 
 
REMARK 4. Under Basel II Accord, the range of values of  x  
where bank's reorganization is required may reduce relative to 
Basel I. 
If the bank chooses assets so that 1y   ( 2y )  1<  as a consequence of 
Basel II Accord (for example, 20%, 50%), then  ξ  is lower than un-
der Basel I. Since 0
~
>∂
∂
ξ
x , then  
x   decreases as  ξ   decreases. Ac-
tually, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Results of the  
QIS 5 (2006) show that minimum required capital under Basel II 
Accord would decrease relative to Basel I: such result holds both for 
the standardized approach and even more for the internal ratings-
based approaches. For all group of countries examined by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, Results of the  QIS 5 (2006), 
retail portfolios drive the reduction in minimum required capital. 
Also the corporate and SME corporate portfolios and equity expo-
sures produce a decrease in minimum required capital.  Therefore, 
we can conjecture that under Basel II relative to Basel I  ξ   is ex-
pected to decrease, reducing in turn the range of values of x   where 
reorganization is required to make up some of the deficiency 
through a restriction of current and subsequent dividends. 
 
4. Bank Equity 
Let us consider now the bank that has paid its premium to the regu-
lator. Following the same procedure as above, we can derive the 
value of equity per units of deposits, denoted by  e  E/D,  which 
satisfy the following equations: 
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By solving equation system (14)-(15)-(16) we get Proposition 2: 
 
 Proposition 2. The equity per units of deposits (e) has the follow-
ing expression: 
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where  
x  1/1     and  .* β=x  
  
Proof.  Expressions (17), (18), (19) can be obtained applying the 
smooth-pasting and high-order conditions on equations (14), (15), 
(16) that is, )~(xe = )~( xe , *)( xe = *)(0 xe , )~(' xe = )~(' xe , *)(' xe  
= *)('0 xe  and the no-bubble condition on e(x). 
 
If  1=β  and  0=α  then expressions (17)-(18)-(19) collapse into 
Merton's expressions for the bank equity evaluation (see Merton 
1978). From (17), (18), (19) the equity per units of deposits is a 
monotonically increasing function of  x   for  x  x .   It is strictly 
convex for  x  x ,   as is usually the case for limited liability lev-
ered equity, and strictly concave for  x > *x . Since the equity posi-
tion can be viewed as ownership of the assets levered by a riskless 
debt issue (the rate paid on which is n) combined with an implicit 
put option on the value of the assets (Merton 1978), in the case of 
the bank equity it is the positive spread  nr −  that induces the con-
cavity. The spread becomes lower if dividends are paid out. 
  
REMARK 5. The value of equity does not increase as capital re-
quirements increase, other things being equal.  
For  xx ~>  , the derivative of  e   with respect to ξ  is negative, 
given the other parameter values, while it is equal to zero for  x  x  
Capital requirements limit the bank's ability to invest in risky assets. 
An effect of regulation is the reduction of bank's equity: capital re-
quirements do lower "bank's profits", and may lower bank's incen-
tive to preserve future rents. 
 
REMARK 6. Insolvent banks increase value by increasing portfolio 
variance; sufficiently capitalized banks maximize value by minimiz-
ing variance. 
It is straightforward to compute  
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   and  ln xx    are negative and the first term in 
parenthesis dominates the second for small enough x . On the con-
trary,  ))()ln(()( 11 −+
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−+
−−
−
−
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−
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∗Σ∂
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xe x   is negative for  
x  x   , since  a

   and  ln xx    are positive, hence  
1a
ba
b 
 ln xx    is negative, and the first term in parenthesis domi-
nates the second for large enough x . It is in keeping with the obser-
vation that as long as it is solvent, the bank pays less than the risk-
less rate on its deposits. Therefore, as long as  x  x    an increase 
in portfolio volatility would increase the probability of becoming in-
solvent, and thus of losing this rent. Thus, sufficiently capitalized 
banks would like to minimize variance. On the contrary, if the bank 
is insolvent, that is  x  x   , the bank may find it more convenient 
to increase portfolio volatility, gambling for resurrection by the time 
of the next audit. Actually, we can obtain the following: 
 
REMARK 7. If  x  x   , the bank would choose the portfolio with 
the highest possible risk level. If  x  x   , such strategy is no 
longer optimal . 
Here we have to look for the optimal  1   such that equity is maxi-
mized. Suppose  .21 σσ <  If we compute 10 / θ∂∂e   an interior solu-
tion for a maximum does not exist; indeed, the only optimal solution 
is  1  0   for  x  x  . It is no longer true for *xx >   since 
0/ <Σ∂∂e  . Indeed, sufficiently capitalized banks would prefer to 
invest a strictly positive fraction of their total assets in the less risky 
asset class too. 
 
REMARK 8. Under Basel II riskiness reduces relative to Basel I, 
other things being equal. 
Straightforward computation shows that  
x
1  0   if  y1  y2 ,  while  
x
1  0   if  y1  y2  . Moreover,   e1   ex . 
x
1  0   if  y1  y2   
while  
 e
1   ex . 
x
1  0   if  y1  y2 . If different risk weights are 
assigned, that is  y1  y2  , the optimal portfolio choice shifts to the 
less risky asset. Therefore, under Basel II with  y1  y2   riskiness is 
reduced relative to the case  y1  y2 .   
 
REMARK 9. Under Basel II equity does not decrease relative to 
Basel I.  
If we can conjecture that under Basel II relative to Basel I  ξ  is ex-
pected to decrease, as it is suggested by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, Results of the  QIS 5 (2006) , then for  x  x  
an increase in equity is expected )0/( <∂∂ ξe while for  xx ~<   eq-
uity is unchanged ( ).0/ =∂∂ ξe  
 
REMARK 10. Although data are not available yet to perform a 
calibration of our model, existing empirical evidence seems not to 
disagree with our predictions. 
The effects of the new capital regulation are likely to depend on the 
extent to which individual banks adopt the new Basel regime. Peura 
and Jokivuolle (2004) provide an analysis of bank capital ratios un-
der the current Basel regime and a simulation of banks’ regulatory 
capital adequacy. Heid (2007) surveys empirical evidence about the 
effects of Basel I and II and provides a simulation study which is 
mainly devoted to assessing the cyclical patterns of capital charges.  
It is estimated that capital relief for high (average) quality portfolios 
is 50% (18%) going from Basel I to Basel II. For Italian banks (see 
Cannata 2006) capital relief for high (average) quality portfolios is 
5.4% (1.3%) under the standardized method, 9.8% (24.5%) under 
IRB method for credit risk going from Basel I to Basel II. Most of 
their results are in line with our predictions. Other works (see, Me-
hran and Thakor 2006) have stressed that banks hold capital beyond 
their regulatory requirements. It would imply that although capital 
requirements decrease going from Basel I to Basel II,  capital re-
quirements are not binding. Whether this fact determines nonethe-
less a change in banks’ behaviour or not has still to be examined 
empirically. We believe this issue becomes of central importance in 
the debate about Basel II when data will be available. 
 
 4. Final remarks 
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature on inter-
temporal bank regulation. First, we introduce a more appropriate no-
tion of capital requirements than is usually adopted in the literature. 
We allow for different risk weights in the measure of capital ade-
quacy, in a way that is in keeping with the basic standardized model 
of the Basel II Accord on capital ratios so that we are able to make a 
comparison of the impact of the two Basel I and Basel II accords on 
banks' behaviour. Second, we allow for dividends payouts and con-
sider the cost of reorganization when bank capital proves to be in-
adequate and examine the effects of capital requirements on risk-
shifting, bank reorganization and bankruptcy in this more complex 
setting. 
    Our analysis reveals how the model parameters influence the 
regulatory policy, the value of deposit insurance liabilities, bank eq-
uity and riskiness. Our main results, summarized in Remarks 1-9, 
provide a further contribution to the debate about the role and effec-
tiveness of minimum required capital rules. 
   A few avenues for future research can be indicated. In this paper 
we have assumed that the audit frequency is independent of the pre-
viously observed level of asset values, in keeping with all the litera-
ture following Merton (1978). However, this is clearly an artifact 
and affects both the closure threshold, the expressions of p and e and 
some of their properties (see Remark 1). A more plausible assump-
tion, such that the audit frequency is inversely related to the asset 
value, would cancel out the property that the cost of audit is a mono-
tonically increasing function of the asset value, which implies, for 
example,  that p would have the usual put option behaviour. As sug-
gested by Bhattacharya, Plank, Strobl and Zechner (2002), one could 
also let λ change after an audit, because the regulator might be will-
ing to increase λ after an audit reveals that the bank is close to bank-
ruptcy. 
  Another possible extension refers to the possibility of alternative 
forms of reorganization, for example, through new equity issue as 
well. Finally, since the Basel II Accord has started its implementa-
tion only a few months ago and is applied by a negligible number of 
banks and countries by now, market data are not yet available to per-
form a check of the results of this paper. A further calibration of our 
results will be interesting when Basel II data will be available. 
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